Abstract: Through a framework drawn from Karl Polanyi's substantivist theorization of economic practices, this paper evaluates the quest for equitable urbanization in Chongqing, a major city-region in southwestern China. Illuminating the tensions arising from two interrelated reforms, namely the ambitious attempt to construct 40 million m 2 of public rental housing between 2010 to 2012 and the large-scale drive to ensure peasant migrants enjoy equal access to social benefits as current urban residents, the paper explains how the quest for equitable urbanization magnifies two nationwide dimensions of institutionalized uneven development, namely 1) the caste-like categorization of populations according to 'urban' and 'rural'; and 2) the coastal bias in national economic development. The paper concludes that this state-driven quest for spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing expresses the dialecticism of economic development in China: it is a social 'counter movement' against the effects of an uneven spatiality that was instituted to drive and deepen the marketization of Chinese society.
Introduction
Beginning from 2007, the Chinese state apparatus launched a series of pathchanging socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing, a city-region 1 in southwestern China.
Widely taken by policymaking, academic and media circles as representative of a unique 'Chongqing model' or 'Chongqing experience' of development, these reforms arguably
placed Chongqing amongst what Shin (2012) terms the "unequal cities of spectacle and mega-events in China". An emergent trend across China, mega-events like the 2008 Beijing
Olympics or the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games were putatively intended to produce a national "unified space" that could at once enable "capital accumulation and socio-political stability for further accumulation" (Shin, 2012: 729) . Unlike these one-off events, however,
Chongqing did not become a national "unified space" through displacing or deferring preexisting social problems -the overarching objective was to resolve them. Hitherto untested on a large scale, these reforms arguably became a "spectacle" in China because they wrestled proactively with national-level institutional constraints.
In spite of what appears to be a "win-win" developmental approach, particularly against a backdrop of prodigious nationwide inequality 2 , the quest for greater social equity in
Chongqing did not receive universal acclaim in China. Labeled neo-Maoist for launching 'red song' singing campaigns (changhong) and portrayed as disregarding the rule of law in its 'anti-Mafia' crackdowns (dahei), the Chongqing government came under further scrutiny for implementing the socioeconomic reforms. Perhaps the most contentious characteristic of these reforms is the large-scale investments required to embed capital accumulation processes in tandem with the enhancement of socio-spatial welfare. On one hand, the Chongqing government successfully pushed for the demarcation of a "nationally strategic" economic development zone known as the Liangjiang New Area; on the other hand, it implemented a host of policies in the Chongqing urban area aimed at easing uneven spatial development associated with 1) the institutionalized organization of social life according to 'urban' and 'rural', a Mao-era legacy; and 2) the coastal bias in the bid to build a 'socialist market economy', a definitive feature of Deng Xiaoping's first-wave 'liberalization' reforms in 1978. Displacing or deferring social problems to other time-spaces, for these critics, was seemingly preferred to confronting them together with the pursuit of economic goals.
Taking this intense scrutiny as the analytical point of departure, this paper aims to add conceptual clarity to the post-2007 socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing. Rather than construe the events occurring within Chongqing as an endogenous expression of Maoist resurgence, the paper explores how local and extra-local factors interact to produce the reforms in Chongqing. As will be shown, the broad directions for the reforms were launched by the Chinese central government in March 2007 . The municipality was chosen as a base for reforms for locational and administrative reasons: it was part of the vast interior hinterland that, over the last three decades, had been unable to keep up with the pace of economic growth in the coastal regions. Yet it was and remains the only municipality in interior China governed directly by the central government. This unique spatio-temporal positioning allowed the central government, then led by Hu Jintao, to directly address two aspects of uneven development that were prevalent at the national scale, namely the urbanrural "dual structure" and the coastal-interior economic disparity. The 'Chongqing experience' is thus more accurately an expression of and a potential solution to the underlying socioeconomic tensions associated with the CPC's seemingly contradictory approach to 'liberalize' the Chinese economy on the back of institutionalized uneven spatial development. As Yao Zhongqiu (hereafter Qiu Feng, to use his official pen name), a prominent China-based public intellectual, puts it:
The 'Chongqing model' contains all the problems that exist in the 'China model' of development, the only difference is that some of these problems were magnified in Chongqing. Hence when we reflect on the 'Chongqing model', we need to be aware of this point, we need to view it against a broader expanse. (Part of academic discussion at the Unirule Institute of Economics, Beijing, 6 December 2012; transcript published in China Review, 15 January 2013: n.p.; author's translation)
To grasp the connections between the reforms in Chongqing and the "broader expanse", this paper develops an analysis that draws on and develops Karl Polanyi's (1944 Polanyi's ( , 1957 ) substantivist conceptualization of economic practices. For Polanyi, the contemporary economy is "instituted" by three 'modes of integration' 3 , namely redistribution, reciprocity and market exchange. All three modes would be present at any one time, although one mode might be more dominant than the others. Through this analytical framing, this paper argues that socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing illustrates the importance of state-driven redistribution in easing preexisting and potential social tensions engendered, paradoxically, by the effects of an uneven spatiality instituted for economic development by the same state apparatus. It conceptualizes the redistributive quest for spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing as a protective act against the effects of instituted uneven development. Viewed against the CPC's concomitant policies to deepen market-like governance in Chinese society, this quest corresponds to what Polanyi (2001 Polanyi ( [1944 : 136) terms "the double movement" in emergent market societies, namely that social counter movements would inevitably check the 3 In The Great Transformation, Polanyi (2001 Polanyi ( [1944 : 55) elaborated on the importance of another mode of integration in pre-capitalist societies known as householding. Defined as "production for one's own use", householding has seemingly taken a backseat in capitalist(ic) societies. As such, this mode received less focus in Polanyi's 1957 work "The economy as an instituted process'. While the Chinese government defines the Chinese political economy as technically 'socialist' and householding in fact is an instituted economic feature under the Household Responsibility System (jiating lianchan zerenzhi), the intention of householding since Mao-era China has never been about subsistence: it was and remains a function of what is broadly known as 'state capitalism'. For this reason, this paper will only examine the roles of redistribution, reciprocity and market exchange as the modes of economic integration in Chongqing and, by extension, China. continuous expansion of markets.
The subsequent four parts of the paper will demonstrate how this counter movement is expressed in and through Chongqing. Section 2 discusses how Polanyi's substantivist approach to economic analysis is developed to examine the socioeconomic reforms in
Chongqing. The geo-historical context of Chongqing's politico-economic evolution is then presented in section 3. Section 4 begins by explaining the socioeconomic rationale of one main reform, the construction of large-scale public rental housing (gongzufang), in relation to another policy to facilitate 'household registration' conversion for rural residents (nongmin hukou zhuanyi). To achieve this objective, the section juxtaposes two sets of empirical materials 4 , namely, 1) narratives -both affirmative and antagonistic -on the redistributive policies to provide large-scale public rental housing and deepen reforms of the hukou (household registration) institution; and 2) quantitative data presented by the different actors. Drawing from the empirical analysis, the paper concludes by (re)focusing on the state's role as a driver of a social counter movement through strategic redistribution. The bigger question crystallized through the Chongqing case is the extent to which future 'double movements' within the Chinese political economy would continue to be determined by institutionalized uneven spatial development -a tool of socioeconomic control that, while serving the CPC so well since it launched the 'socialist high tide' in 1958, appears to be under immense strain in the current conjuncture. 4 The empirical materials presented in this paper consist largely of narratives drawn from policy documents, news articles and academic essays published in Mandarin. These narratives, which reflect the views of major causal actors who were not accessible for interviews, are significant for the analysis employed in this paper. Complementary materials are drawn from the author's personal observations through participation in academic seminars; discussions and interviews with local government officials and scholars; and visits to field sites in Chongqing. The overarching objective of the empirical analysis is not to 'speak for' the socioeconomic configuration of a field site 'from a distance'; it is to bring existing theory -namely, the Polanyian framework -into contact with the discourses and statistics emerging from the field site. There is no a priori privileging of primary or secondary data; data that potentially contributes to theoretical re-construction was identified and evaluated.
The (re)institutionalization of socioeconomic embeddedness in China: a substantivist conceptualization
Economic substantivism is an analytical approach postulated by Polanyi (1944 Polanyi ( , 1957 Polanyi ( , 1977 to contrast the formalism that characterizes neoclassical economics. The primary characteristic of substantivism is that the 'economy' cannot be abstracted and theorized as an entity that is self-regulated by ecumenical laws of evolution. By extension, an economy can never be distinct from its constitutive socio-spatial formation. "While substantivist explanations are crafted in context rich and institutionally saturated settings", Peck (2013 Peck ( : 1555 explains in an incisive exploration of Polanyian analytical approaches, "formalism implies a preference for parsimonious reasoning, prefabricated models, and singular logics, like the rational-choice paradigm." Indeed, conditions of scarcity -the analytical basis of the rational-choice paradigm -do not solely determine economic choice (Polanyi, 1957) ; economic processes, as Polanyi (2001 Polanyi ( [1944 : 48) observes of pre-and non-capitalist economies, were intrinsically predicated on social goals:
The outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological research is that man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships. He does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets. He values material goods only in so far as they serve this end.
The emphasis on "social relationships" as determinant of economic practices is crucial not only for the understanding of individual behavior; economic institutions also need to ensure their practices do not undermine social stability. In the contemporary conjuncture, these institutions are invariably established inside and/or alongside individual state apparatuses. Insofar as these state apparatuses claim to be representative of 'the people'
(who arguably constitute the state's primary 'social assets'), their respective economic strategies would be entwined with the need to safeguard their social legitimacy amongst the people they govern. This entwinement is especially pronounced in China because the ruling To comprehend the dynamics of Chinese politico-economic evolution, the CPC should be conceptualized as an embedded social actor in the first instance; as a mediator and driver of economic policies to achieve its self-determined social goal, i.e. a 'Harmonious Society' (hexie shehui) defined by the egalitarianism end-state known as 'Common
Affluence' (gongtong fuyu). Indeed, it is this longstanding ideological commitment that positions Chinese socioeconomic evolution against Polanyi's (2001 Polanyi's ( [1944 : 60) definition of a 'disembedded economy', that "instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system". Strong market regulation, characterized by the disembedding circulation of three 'fictitious commodities' (land, labor power and money), effectively means social actors would be subservient to the prerogatives of private capitalist producers. Because the CPC remains committed to create a communistic end-state 6 , it is obliged to preclude "fictitious commodities" from fully dictating the organization of social life. As will be addressed shortly, the socioeconomic reforms in
Chongqing exemplify this obligation. Polanyi's (1957; 1977) conceptualization of the economy as an "instituted process"
forms the core of this paper's analytical framework. He identifies three major 'forms of integration' that 'institute' the modern (capitalist) economy, namely redistribution, reciprocity and market exchange. Of these three forms, redistribution and reciprocity are "two principles of behavior not primarily associated with economics" (Polanyi, 2001 (Polanyi, [1944 : 49). As this 5 The CPC leadership, still committed to what Deng Xiaoping called the 'universal truth of Marxism', understands very well the revolutionary potential of violence: it was precisely through violence -the CPC fought a protracted civil war between 1946-1949 -that the CPC became the ruling government of China. The Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s and the Tiananmen protests in 1989 were two other major instances where revolutionary fervor were accompanied with violence. 6 In the summer of 2013, the Chinese President Xi Jinping vowed to the country "our red nation will never change color" (New York Times, 16 August 2013) . Having demonstrated a clear disdain for 'empty talk' (kongtan), Xi's assertion can be taken as an a priori (re)statement of intent. It is against this concrete intention -namely, to enable an evolution towards a communistic endstate -that subsequent empirical phenomena should be dialectically evaluated.
paper will show, it is precisely because of this non-association that they are important for a market economy:
Redistribution: This integrative process presupposes the centralization of goods and money by a powerful social institution, or what Polanyi (2001 Polanyi ( [1944 : 51) calls the "institutional pattern of centricity": it "provides a track for the collection, storage, and redistribution of goods and services… [I] n all economies of kind a similar need exists, be the group ever so numerous. And the larger the territory and the more varied the produce, the more will redistribution result in an effective division of labor, since it must help to link up geographically differentiated groups of producers". As Polanyi (1977: 37) elaborates, "In the case of redistribution...the movement cannot proceed without an established center from which redistribution takes place. Redistribution is not an individual pattern at all; and even when started on a small scale, it would depend upon the prior existence of a recognized center."
In the Chinese context, the central state apparatus had, since its establishment in 1949, sought to regularly reproduce its position as the 'recognized centre' in the nationwide allocation of means and output of production. The underlying justification for this redistributive commitment is to preclude social tensions and set the Chinese political economy on the path towards an unknown end-state known as 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' (cf. Lim, 2014 ). Yet, the very ability of the central state apparatus to hold itself as the "recognized centre" and produce an "effective division of labor", in Polanyi's parlance, is predicated on reciprocity between socioeconomic actors located in different geographical regions.
Reciprocity: An act of transfer which is not price-determined, but from which an act of transfer with an approximately symbolic value is expected in return (either in future or immediately). These transfers reveal specifically the relationships between actors (e.g. kinship networks); they generate trust and are fundamental to the creation of social harmony. In the non-capitalist societies of Western Melanesia, Polanyi (2001 Polanyi ( [1944 : 51) observes, reciprocity was characterized by the "institutional pattern of symmetry": an arrangement of "duality" facilitated the exchange of goods, disguised as gift-giving, between the coastal and inland villages. Yet Polanyi (2001 [1944 : 51) was quick to add that the origins of "institutional symmetry" were unclear, and that it would be "impracticable" for this process to exist on its own in the long run. Rather, "symmetry and centricity will meet halfway the needs of reciprocity and redistribution; institutional patterns and principles of behavior are mutually Exchange as a form of integration is dependent on the existence of a market system, an institutional pattern which, contrary to common assumptions, does not originate in random actions of exchange" (Polanyi 1977: 37) . This market system, Polanyi (1944) avers, 'fictionalizes' three entities -labor (power), land and money -as commodities. These 'commodities' are "fictitious" because they cannot innately be produced for sale; their saleable 'nature' is a material construction constituted by and contingent on processes of redistribution and reciprocity. Redistribution is not the only necessary process for market-building, however; if the participants choose to disrespect rules and disrupt the terms of exchange (i.e. lack of reciprocity), exchange relations could break down. As such, the 'free' market is a deontological entity; changing and often contested redistributive and reciprocal processes determine the degree of 'freedom' in and the geographic extent of any market (cf. section 4).
These three forms of socioeconomic integration are taken as occuring simultaneously and symbiotically rather than chronologically. In a subsequent development of The Great Transformation, Polanyi (1957: 256) (Peck and Zhang, 2013: 388; emphases-in-original) Through the Chongqing case, this paper examines how Polanyi's three integrative mechanisms intersect within a "fundamentally heterogeneous" Chinese socio-economy. On one hand, this place-specific intersection appears different from the national-scale combination of these mechanisms; on the other, it is expressive of national-scale structural contradictions. Taken together, these phenomena highlight antagonisms associated with the Chinese central government's attempt to expand economic liberalization and its seemingly contradictory commitment to ease a crucial precondition of the liberalization processuneven spatial development (cf. Lim, 2014) . That the post-2007 redistributive strategies took center-stage as a social 'counter movement' in Chongqing, this paper argues, in itself indicates the inability of reciprocal economic relations to exclusively enhance social equity at the national scale. More crucially, insofar as the CPC continues to expand its marketization drive, the Chongqing reforms represent the socially-protective part of what Polanyi (2001 Polanyi ( [1944 : 138) terms a "double movement":
The one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a selfregulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely laissezfaire and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the marketprimarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes -and using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods.
Parallel to Polanyi's (2001 Polanyi's ( [1944 ) observation of earlier societies, the socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing demonstrate the entwinement of redistribution and reciprocity as modes of economic integration. The growing dominance of market exchange in China presupposes the existence and exchange of personal assets protected legally by a strong "established centre". Yet the same "established centre" is required to hold market actors in check; it is required to ensure the social inequality ensuing from marketization (which is now acute in income and geographic terms) does not undermine the stability of the market economy. There is no doubt that only one institution possesses the institutional centricity so crucial for market coordination in the current conjuncture; there is also no doubt only one institution possesses the power to introduce, in Polanyi's parlance, "protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention" to protect the Chinese society from the concomitant problems of market-like governance (cf. ibid.). This institution is the CPC.
In the following discussion, this paper argues that state-driven redistribution is not a zero-sum approach (i.e. more state involvement = contracting markets); rather, the reshaping of Chongqing's socio-spatial structure overlaps the reconfiguration of the cityregion's industrial structure. The socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing are of theoretical significance in this aspect: while Chinese state power is commonly perceived to be increasingly captured by capitalists (of which paradoxically include factions in control of state-owned enterprises), these reforms illuminate the state's role as a social leader whose overall goal is to produce "Common Affluence" without precluding the production of new industrial spaces. What the reforms in Chongqing exemplify, then, is a dialectical attempt by the central government to keep highly contingent capital investments within the Chinese market economy while also fulfill Deng's 1988 commitment to spatial egalitarianism.
Chongqing as the "big platform" of experimental reforms
Chongqing is one of the four 8 province-level cities (zhixiashi) in China. Originally part of Sichuan province, the core urban area of Chongqing and three surrounding districts were rescaled into a city-region and directly governed by the central government on 18 June 1997. Interestingly, Chongqing was previously a zhixiashi: during World War II and the Chinese civil war (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) , Chongqing was the temporary capital of the Republic of However, Deng overturned Mao's preference to develop China's interior hinterland by giving the eastern seaboard absolute priority in ascending the economic 'ladder'. He assumed that 8 The other three province-level cities are along the coast, namely, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. These cities are centrally-governed because they are deemed highly strategic to national politicaleconomic development. 9 As an entity, the 'Republic of China' is no longer recognized by the United Nations. It continues to exist in name, however, with its base in Taiwan island, and continues to be recognized internationally by a handful of countries. For a full geo-historical discussion, see Lim (2012) . 10 In view of potential geopolitical threats, Mao Zedong's government decided in 1964 to designate China's coastal belt as a 'first front' of defense, and the southwestern interior as the 'third front'. All areas in between are categorized as the 'second front'.
the economic fruits of development in the 'first mover' belt would diffuse systematically downwards to other rungs of the ladder, and as aforementioned, issued an injunction 11 that interior provinces must patiently await the reciprocal assistance from (coastal) provinces that first attained economic growth (ref. section 2).
The 'ladder-step' logic was first expressed in 1980 through the formation of four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China's southeastern region 12 . Until 1994, selected coastal provinces also benefited from preferential fiscal redistribution to accelerate their respective developments. For more than two decades, then, Chongqing's economic growth -like many cities and provinces in China's western interior -lagged behind provinces along the coast. National income inequality worsened correspondingly. As one academic/planner from Sichuan province puts it:
Be it value-added production based on imported raw materials, or simple trade, the eastern region was first to connect with the world. As such, the broad western region could only provide supply-side impulses to the east, supplying natural gas, minerals, of course, incessantly supplying labor power…Against this background, the western region became a base of raw materials and labor power, but because of no good redistributive structure, the ultimate outcome is faster development in the eastern region and slower development in the west. It is clear that the ladder step theory did not work. (Interview, March 2012, Chongqing; author's translation).
It was only in the mid-1990s, after the Three Gorges Dam national energy project was launched, that Chongqing (re)emerged as a strategically significant city. Because of the sheer size and scale of the dam construction, many settlements in the upstream valleys of the Yangtze River had to be flooded. An estimated two-thirds of the 8 million affected residents were originally located in Sichuan province, the majority of them living in poverty.
This engendered a colossal logistical and governance issue: the Sichuan provincial government, which already had a huge and relatively poor population under its charge, was confronted with the challenge of resettling and then re-employing the affected residents without further straining its administrative and fiscal resources.
At that conjuncture, there were proposals to create a new province in the Three Gorges region 13 . It soon became apparent, however, that the central government was keen to avoid the costly administrative duplication and politics associated with establishing a new province. The primary policy concern, as the former Premier Li Peng put it in a 1986 diary account, was to prioritize the dam-building project over the redrawing of provincial boundaries (Li 2003) . Since Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan, was too far away from the flooded areas, Chongqing was identified as a more logical 'scalar fix' for the population resettlement issue. To ease the financial impact on the Sichuan government, the central government agreed to administer the districts of Fuling, Wanxian and Qianjiang, then amongst the poorest areas in Sichuan, as resettlement areas. These districts were then merged with Chongqing's core urban zone to form the sprawling Chongqing
Municipality. Through this territorial rescaling, it is intriguing to see in the Chongqing experience yet another geo-historical twist of fate: demoted by Mao, the city-region's strategic location emplaced it as a zhixiashi for the second time in its history. (Dushikuaibao, 7 March 2011) .At the same time, large-scale socioeconomic reforms were launched (for a timeline of developments, see Table 1 ).
On the social front, the Chongqing government believed the city-region's social safety net needed to be fortified simultaneously. This two-pronged developmental approach led to a surge in both GDP and fixed capital formation (see Figure 1 ). [H]ousing prices have skyrocketed in cities, with the national average housing price increasing by 250% in the decade between 2000 and 2010. The housing price-income ratio classifies much of China as "severely unaffordable" in terms of housing. In big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, a modest apartment can cost multiple millions of yuan to purchase, and thousands of yuan to rent, making housing affordability the top concern of most low-and middle-income households. As a result, millions of migrants have been completely left out of the "Chinese dream," with few owning homes in cities and most living in extremely crowded, poor quality dwellings. (In The Diplomat, n.p. 14 May 2013)
Of particular significance, Huang adds, is the connection between housing unaffordability 14 After Deng launched China's economic reforms, housing officially became a commodity in China in 1988. Since 1998, state-owned work units were prohibited from directly providing housing for workers, which expanded private housing markets. (For more elaborate discussion, see Zhou and Logan, 2002; Huang, 2004 Migrants are generally more vulnerable in the housing market due to their lower incomes and the discriminatory Household Registration System, or hukou system (often called an internal passport system), under which migrants are not considered "legal" residents in cities despite living and working in there over the long-term. Without local urban hukou, migrants are not entitled to welfare benefits such as subsidized housing. Even in Shenzhen, the city of migrants, local hukou is required to access low-income housing. In others cities like Beijing, several years of local hukou is required before applying for low-income housing. (Ibid.)
Because residents holding urban hukou almost always enjoy better social benefits than those holding rural hukou, rural residents often find themselves disenfranchised and discriminated against when they relocate to cities. While the abolishment of this institutionalized inequality is regularly touted, its structure remains intact and is seemingly intractable (Chan and Buckingham, 2008) . In Chan's (1994) evocative terms, these migrants continue to live in "cities with invisible walls". These seemingly intractable issues pertaining to the provision of low-income housing in the city to non-urban hukou residents would be addressed -or "magnified", to re-borrow Qiu In reality it's not so strange, actually many SOEs are involved in da ban on a daily basis!"
Spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing as a social 'counter movement'

Socializing capital accumulation through urban-rural integration
On the other hand, as Wen Tiejun, a prominent China-based economist, observes, the large-scale, state-driven approach to socioeconomic development in Chongqing cannot be taken as an anti-market measure. Rather, this approach is the sine qua non of industrialization in Chongqing, a process that would not otherwise be automatically taken up by the private sector:
The advantage in Chongqing is the ability to concentrate energies and launch huge projects (jizhong liliang gan dashi)…Because the developmental capital in Chongqing is too high, most ordinary private firms would ineffective on this front; moreover, because the developmental parameters are to a large extent outcomes of the discussions between the Chongqing government and the central government, Chongqing received 12 beneficial policies. As such, the developmental capital could only be taken on by sizeable state-owned enterprises" (Wen, 2011: 65; author's translation).
Building on these observations, this paper argues that the objectives of large-scale socioeconomic reforms and the ways they are financed must be understood in relation to the Chongqing government's simultaneous goal to expand market-like governance (ref.
section 2). To begin with, the provision of rental housing is not simply a redistributive process; although the project is publicly-owned and administered, it produces and functions through a market -a rental market. In other words, while the government functions as a commodity producer that does not commit to the extraction of supernormal profits from its customers, it nevertheless is still a producer that extracts rent through commodity exchange. By unilaterally establishing the exchange-value of rental apartments, the Chongqing government aims to undercut what private producers are otherwise expected to charge. Property speculation is further precluded through the prohibition of a secondary resale market for rental flats (cf. In addition, Huang and Tang Zongwei, the deputy director of the Liangjiang New Area Administrative Committee, elaborate how the large-scale state investments in public rental housing cannot be defined narrowly as process to reduce social discontent. Rather, these investments are integral to the national strategy to establish Chongqing -and Liangjiang New Area in particular -as the economic fulcrum (jingji shuniu) of interior China:
The entry of rural workers into the city cannot lead to new poverty enclaves, nor can they be allowed to buy houses, they can't afford it. Since there are several million people waiting to enter the city [i.e. Chongqing], we must find a way to solve their housing needs…so long as you are a worker in Chongqing, so long as you have worked for three, five years, the city needs you to work, then you can apply for rental housing. For new university graduates who enter Chongqing, so long as a firm employs you, then you can apply for rental housing. In sum, our housing safeguard system runs on the basis of urban-rural integration. Just within Liangjiang New Area we aim to construct around 8.5 million m 2 , this does not include the public rental housing planned elsewhere in Chongqing municipality…The meaning of our public rental housing project is distinct from conventional notions, our project is to assist those who are just about to commence employment or become entrepreneurs. These groups of people come from everywhere, they either do not have housing or temporarily cannot afford housing, if you don't assist, they can't settle down. Hence our public rental housing is targeted at a million university graduates, researchers and high-quality industrial workers, it is to help them enter Liangjiang, to help them integrate in this city, and it simultaneously resolves the problem of industrial support. (Tang Zongwei, interview with 21 st Century Herald, 27 November 2013; author's translation)
Within the broader reform package, the rental housing project's socioeconomic objective complements another urban-rural integration policy, namely the flexible conversion of rural migrant workers' hukou into 'urban' status (see Table 2 ). As Youqin Huang's comments in section 3 indicates, most migrant workers nationwide could not qualify for subsidized public housing in cities across China. The reform of hukou institutions in Chongqing is a spatially-targeted attempt to unhinge this enduring Mao-era legacy. Central to this attempt, as the Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan was at pains to point out, is a recognition of peasant migrants' inherent right to be treated equally as full Chinese citizens, not just as economic units of labor power:
Assuming a city has 3 million registered residents and 7 million peasant workers, after a few decades, when the city does not need these rural workers, they are dismissed back home, pushing the population down to only the [original] 3 million registered residents, then this urbanization process is unhealthy, abnormal, it violates international conventions, it violates market principles, it violates the principles of fairness and justice. (Mayor Huang, interview with China Economy and Informatization, 18 January 2012; author's translation).
Improving the treatment of peasant migrant workers is a matter of human rights, it is a problem of citizen rights. To treat peasant migrant workers benevolently is a matter of our conscience, it is a matter of governors' consciences…Over the past few years Chongqing arranged for 3.6 million peasant workers to convert their hukou. The crux of our program is to facilitate peasant workers to enter the city, not to have more peasants in the city. With the development of urban-based industries, many new industrial and service sector positions have become available, they need to be filled by a large number of peasant workers. In the several years where these workers help fill the open job positions, it would be unreasonable if you do not provide them with urban hukous, it would be unjust, this would be half-baked urbanization, not a true urbanization. To mayor Huang, the impossibility of launching instant reforms is precisely why the hukou institutional reforms must be implemented in stages. After all, socio-spatial transformation -which is akin to forming a bridge for a large party to cross a wide and deep river -requires time:
The urbanization process cannot envisage a situation where, after two groups of people were kept apart for thirty or forty years, several hundred millions of rural workers are accumulated in cities and then suddenly it is announced their hukou will be changed. This [hukou conversion] should not be a sudden occurrence, it should begin now, it should be a natural and continuous transformation process. (Interview with China Economy and Informatization, 18 January 2012; author's translation).
Huang's emphases on "fairness", "justice" and "citizen rights" in Chongqing is clearly an attempt to broaden the entitlements of what Smart and Lin (2007) terms "local citizenship". For Smart and Lin (2007: 286) , "local citizenship" is an extension of local governmental commitment and redistribution; it is a recognition "of the way in which China's distinctive system of household registration combines with the collectivist/exclusivist elements of the key social institutions of the danwei (enterprise) and the village to produce a system in which entitlements of citizenship are determined locally". There is a nuance in the re-determination of local citizenship in Chongqing, however. While the large-scale hukou conversion of peasants into 'non-agricultural' citizens and, concomitantly, the provision of social services to accommodate their relocation to urban areas are indeed "determined locally", they are at once an outcome of centrally-redistributed experimental power (i.e. xianxing xianshi quan; ref. section 2). Indeed, it was only after China's President Hu Jintao issued a '314' integrated development strategy for Chongqing in 2007 that the city-region's policymakers immediately went about launching policies to reduce the inherent rural-urban barriers (chengxiang bilei; ref. Table 1 ). The "local" attempt to enhance citizenship rights in Chongqing is thus more aptly conceptualized as a trans-local redistributive effect.
One primary expression of this effect is the provision of public rental housing to rural residents expected to convert their hukou to the 'non-agricultural' (or, more simply, 'urban') category. Expanding housing supply to support hukou reforms (50% of rental housing stock are allocated for new peasant migrants) is a redistributive counter-movement against the straining impacts of housing price inflation, as aforementioned a phenomenon triggered by the nationwide commodification of housing provision (cf. Polanyi 1944, 137 ; section 3). This counter-movement is particularly important as spiraling housing prices would most likely impact newly-minted urban residents who, like their predecessors in many of China's urbanindustrial parks, are most likely to be employed in low-wage, labor intensive industries or service sectors in Chongqing's urbanized industrial areas (particularly in the 'nationally strategic' Liangjiang New Area).
To be sure, because the Chongqing government's redistributive focus is circumscribed to controlling land rather than finance or labor power (two other 'fictitious' entities Polanyi regards as potentially debilitating for social cohesion), the provision of public rental housing will not completely preclude other counter-movements (e.g. protests against labor and environmental exploitation by firms, already commonplace in coastal cities). Put another way, the ongoing quest for spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing is never going to be a total resolution of extant social ills in China. Rather, its expression is dialectical -specific 'freedoms' of market exchange are negated without an abandonment of market mechanisms. For this reason, these reforms represent at best an attempt to negotiate an inherited institutional precondition of the CPC's ongoing bid to develop a "socialist market society" -uneven spatial development. Assessed in terms of its national significance, the overarching objective of the Chongqing reforms is more accurately to perpetuate and proliferate market exchange without exacerbating the socio-spatial inequality that already exists at the national scale. Indeed, as will be elaborated shortly, these reforms were never meant to be a Maoist-styled, anti-market counter-revolution.
The (market) value of the Chongqing 'counter movement'
As the socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing gradually became reality, oppositional voices grew concomitantly. Specifically, the Chongqing reforms triggered a nationwide debate on 'making a bigger cake' (zuoda dangao, or growing the accumulated capital) in relation to 'sharing the cake well' (fenhao dangao, or redistributing existing gains). This debate illustrates a seemingly incommensurable conception of socio-spatial justice: to some, redistributing resources to enhance socio-spatial justice was the antithesis of expanded capital accumulation, while others viewed the enhanced stability accruing from redistribution as the precondition of expanded accumulation. In reality, however, the approach to local governance over the past three decades suggests clearly that 'cake sharing' is less important than 'cake making'. "To compete for foreign investment", Wu Such populism means sparing no expense to please the population, but it caused many problems for Chongqing's budget. One cannot invest such huge resources while having little regard for where such resources come from. One also has to consider whether such investments produce returns." (South China Morning Post, 26 March 2012) The theoretical assumptions of these comments exemplify what Polanyi has observed to be a movement towards the establishment of a "self-regulatory market". As Wu Jinglian has argued elsewhere, only two possible developmental trajectories exist for the Chinese economy in the current conjuncture: one involves the "perfection" (wanshan) of market reforms, with political power circumscribed by the rule of law, the other a "cul-desac" (qiongtu) characterized by state capitalism and crony capitalism (China Entrepreneur, 10 September 2013) . For Mao Yushi, the market is quite simply "the most successful institution" in the course of human history (Interview with Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 4 June 2012). Placed in relation to concrete empirical facts in China, however, this market fundamentalism is shaky in two ways.
First, the argument that the socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing were untenable just because they reflect populist politics needs unpacking. In concrete terms, the pressing needs for alleviating what was (and remains) a growing rich-poor divide in China's largest municipality -which in itself is an outcome of the coastal-and urban-bias in earlier developmental strategies -would have been sufficient to merit state (pre-emptive and ameliorative) action (cf. section 3). Interestingly, Wu Jinglian showed he has never forgotten class struggle with an observation that "socioeconomic contradictions [in China] have already reached a critical point, we cannot continue to blunder, a revolution would happen if we continue to blunder" (China Entrepreneur, 1 November 2013) . Mao Yushi has similarly acknowledged that "the biggest drawback of markets is the creation of rich-poor inequality. , what we now need to consider is how to solve this problem. Populism is a reaction to crony capitalism, there is first crony capitalism before there is populism. Now many intellectuals follow the wave to oppose populism, they equate the 'Chongqing model' to populism. I feel there should not be such a definition, resolving problems associated with people's livelihoods are separate from populism.
The second problematic assumption is associated with the approach to resolve problems associated with people's livelihoods, namely the involvement of credit markets in the redistributive process in Chongqing. At one level, this concern about potential budgetary delinquency is warranted: many local governments in China have indeed encountered difficulties repaying debt to (nominally-)private creditors. It could indeed be argued that lax regulation and monitoring of lending practices to government-linked institutions is an ingredient that feeds crony capitalism. This situation is well summed up by Larry Lang, a prominent Hong Kong-based analyst of Chinese economic development:
Honestly speaking, I am really worried about the local governmental debts in China. In 2009, local governments could still borrow from new sources to repay old creditors; by the end of 2012, what they did was blatantly request extensions of repayment deadlines. And does everyone know, between 2012 and 2014 about 35% of the financial loans will mature? I do not dare to imagine what measures our local governments and banking system will adopt to address wave after wave of maturing debts. (Lang, 19 December 2013: n.p.) It should be clear, however, that the cause for worry is not about whether state agencies should borrow from credit markets at all. In this regard, Mao Yushi's point that the debt-independent ability to create wealth (presumably a task exclusive to private firms) should undergird fiscal redistribution becomes a paradoxical assumption: in a capitalistic system, wealth creation is driven by debt. Mao Yushi ostensibly assumes that only private firms -rather than state-owned enterprises -should undertake debt because of their presupposed "efficiency" at wealth creation, while the redistributive process (which, in China, includes financing state-owned enterprises) should not imbricate wealth creation processes (which theoretically means any activity that qualifies for debt-financing). The public scholar Qiu Feng offers a different interpretation on the debt-financing issue:
Of course, many people criticize these explorations in Chongqing, they claim that the Chongqing government has undertaken a lot of debt from banks, that its finances is already bankrupt. To be honest, this kind of argument is strange because almost all local governments are shouldering heavy debts, most local governments debt-finance their 'projects for face-creation' (mianzi gongcheng) or 'projects for political results' (zhengji gongcheng). To just criticize Chongqing based on this point seems unreasonable. What can be investigated is how much has been done [in Chongqing] to improve people's lives. (In China Review, 2013) In an interesting parallel with Polanyi's (2001 Polanyi's ( [1944 : 55) observation that "individual motives" determine the nature of redistribution, Qiu Feng calls attention to the objectives of redistributive policies in Chongqing. The redistributive process, for Qiu, cannot be assumed to be negative ab initio; it is important to evaluate whether redistributive policies can enhance socioeconomic development. This paper concurs with Qiu's contention. As section 4.1 has shown, the housing project is entwined with the hukou conversion and industrialization drives. If the Chongqing government had chosen not to "invest" -the term Wu Jinglian uses to describe fiscal redistribution -in the expansion of housing stock (rental or ownership-based), the investment risk would first be borne by real estate corporations, before being ultimately transposed onto individual buyers through a quasi-cornering process (current low-income urban residents and new migrants need somewhere to stay after all, which translates into definite demand for housing). Yet the Chongqing policymakers determined the lower income strata of Chongqing's urban migrants would find privatelysupplied apartments unaffordable (see section 4.1). This meant the lower income strata could not generate effective demand for privately-supplied housing unless high-risk credit provisions were given.
Viewed this way, the Chongqing government's involvement as a housing stock supplier is a means to reduce social risks of housing debt defaults by lower income earners à la the US sub-prime mortgage crisis of [2007] [2008] . Specifically, it illuminates the negative relationship between excessive housing debt and the suppression of effective consumer demand. As it has become clear in many cities within China and even across East Asia, when housing supply is controlled by private property groups (usually an oligopoly), many individuals would take up -and be locked-in by -housing debts that extend very long terms (30 to 35-year repayment periods are commonplace). Whether individuals -especially new rural migrants -in Chongqing are able to satisfy their loan obligations over two to three decades is moot per se (the US national sub-prime housing market crash is a case-inpoint); the more crucial question, rather, is the impact of long-term property debt servicing on economic expansion: when individuals have to devote significant portions of their disposable income to repay housing loans, their ability to purchase consumer goods naturally decreases.
Given the inverse correlation between high housing debt and effective consumer demand, the public rental housing project in Chongqing offers a potential economic "return", to use Wu's parlance. It frees up disposable income, which raises the propensity for direct consumption and/or an increase in savings (and which then fuels new rounds of investments). This thus fulfills a key developmental objective -the expansion of domestic demand -of China's 12 th 5-Year Plan (2011 -2015 . The 'double movement' internal in the Chongqing public rental housing project, assessed against this broader politico-economic context, transposes into a necessary supply-side "investment".
To address the critiques of these "investments" directly, it would be more pertinent, to assess the feasibility of the repayment channels. There were also differences on this However, Liu and Wu's presumptions and empirical calculations were called into question when assessed against the official accounts of the Chongqing budget and the planned repayment channels of the public rental housing financial package. To begin, the notion of an international deficit warning level applies only to national economies (and even so, the 3% limit is a relative rather than an absolute indicator). The causality of this crossscalar relation was overlooked: Chongqing is administratively a subnational economy, which means it has a redistributive relation with what Polanyi (1977: 37) projects that involve credit is whether the projected repayment channels are feasible (more on this shortly). As such, while fixed capital investments in Chongqing have indeed soared over the past five years (ref. Figure 1 ), whether they offer concrete financial returns -and in turn vindicate the state's redistributive "investments" -is contingent on the ability of these investments to drive and benefit from the accompanying series of industrialization projects.
The inaccuracy of Liu and Wu's interpretations is further underscored by new information on Chongqing's budgetary health and debt-repayment channels (for detailed summary see Table 3 ). According to comprehensive statistics provided by an anonymous spokesperson from the Chongqing Finance Bureau, the city's fiscal standing remains stable:
Over the past ten years in our city, deficit has yet to appear in budgetary composition at the beginning of the year and the closing of accounts at year end…There are three sources of fiscal revenue for local governments: apart from direct revenue, there are carry-over funds from the previous year and transfer payments from the central government. Huang's explanation offers a counterpoint to Wu Jinglian's interpretation that the housing project gives "little regard" to the origins and eventual "returns" of fiscal expenditures.
Indeed, as Huang further emphasizes, the provision of public rental housing operates on the basis of market-like exchange (cf. section 4.1):
The rent to be collected is at least equivalent to the interest payments for bank loans.
[…] But there are still management costs and the 80 billion yuan principal sum to repay, how can this be balanced? No problem, because a third of the tenants in rental housing may want to buy over the title of the flats after 3 or 5 years, when they do so, at a capital cost of around 3000 yuan per m 2 , it is possible to repay 40 to 50 billion yuan with sales of more than 10 million m 2 . In addition, 4 million m 2 of the 40 million m 2 will be sold for commercial use…[it] will generate 40 billion yuan, so this debt can be balanced out. (Ibid.)
Table 3 around here
Of particular significance in the repayment plan is the function of land as at once a 'fictitious commodity' and a social good. As section 2 has explained, redistribution can scale back the 'freedom' in markets. In the instance of housing provision for the lower income populace, land valued at 30 billion yuan was stripped of its "fictitious" façade (i.e. exchange value = 0 yuan). This redistributive process illustrates the path-dependence of development in China. The ability to determine what land is to be 'fictionalized' as a commodity exists because the CPC never relinquished the Mao-era institution of land nationalization. As such, it is able to prioritize use value over exchange value in cases it deems to be more socially effective. Whether this prioritization is less economically "efficient" is a non-issue because, to follow Mao Yushi's aforementioned acknowledgement, market mechanisms inherently generate and are unable to overcome social disparities (cf. Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 4 June 2012).
Because the fiscal capacity of the Chongqing government would be smaller than those of the market actors combined, plans must be in place to enable the government to demonstrate its ability to recover the costs "invested" in the social facilities. Otherwise its policies would be financially irresponsible. That Huang acknowledged the importance of bank credit as a financing channel is unsurprising; as Qiu Feng has emphasized, debtfinancing is commonly used by many local governments across China. Of theoretical significance is Huang's detailed delineation of how the "debt can be balanced out".
Specifically, the entwinement of the "balancing" process with market mechanisms is telling.
As Table 3 shows, the rental rates are not fully subsidized by the state; rather the costs can only be recovered because part of the available real estate would be rented or sold at market-determined prices. The redistributive process of 'de-fictionalizing' the value of land is thereby contingent on the ability to perpetuate its 'fictional' characteristic as a commodity. If anything, this illustrates a tension that is intrinsic to the CPC's official pursuit of a "socialist market economy".
Through the analysis of the funding rationale, it is clear that the state-driven social counter movement in Chongqing is not about the 'state vs. the market' or 'politics vs. economics'. It is about the interaction between the state apparatus and market mechanisms; it is about politics determining economics through spatial reconfiguration in order to enhance social development. As such, the seemingly high-cost investments to effect spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing cannot be taken as antithetical to deepening marketization -or, more precisely, to deepening state-led marketization. The very raison d'être of spatial egalitarianism is to facilitate the socio-spatial absorption of peasant migrant workers that would in turn support the incoming industries (a substantial number of which are state-invested). Because entwinements with market mechanisms have become de jure in the regulation of social life, what will concretely define 'development' in China will inevitably involve market exchange. As the repayment plan for the Chongqing reforms indicate, a social counter movement in China may never be external to markets; its ostensibly non-market objective, expressed paradoxically in market-like ways in Chongqing, could be at once for markets.
Conclusion
For peasant workers who enter a city today, on what basis should their children feel, 20 years later, that they are still rural residents rather than the local residents of that city? If historical evolution cannot find a connection point here, then our generation would be lamentable; it would be one with no foresight or sense of justice. -Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan (Interview with Chongqing Wanbao, 25 August 2010; author's translation)
The urban-rural dual structure is the primary obstacle restraining the integration of urbanrural development. -Communiqué of the 3rd Plenum of the 18 th Congress of the CPC (Xinhua, 12 November 2013) Two decades ago, the proclamation "Development is the absolute principle" (fazhan shi yingdaoli) by China's then-leader Deng Xiaoping arguably triggered GDP-worship across the country. In the subsequent decade, 'development' was narrowly interpreted as the inexorable quest to maximize surplus value capture through the market exchange of commodities. The inevitable consequence was pronounced socio-spatial inequality. It was against this national context of economic-geographical unevenness and rising social angst that led Wang Shaoguang (2002 n.p.) to proclaim "social equity is also the absolute principle". After Hu Jintao became China's leader in 2003 and launched the ideology 'Scientific Perspective on Development', the quest to reconcile high-speed economic expansion with more equitable redistribution gained momentum. As Hu would later add, "development is the absolute principle, [but] stability is the absolute task, without stability, nothing can be done, whatever we have achieved will also be lost" (www.chinanews.com, 1 July 2011; author's translation). In this regard, Hu's '314' injunction for experimental reforms in the Chongqing city-region is evidently a spatial expression of a shift in the CPC's developmental ideology (ref. Table 1 ). The "absolute" task of producing social stability in China, as the socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing indicates, has to be predicated on the impeachment of instituted uneven development. This paper has presented a substantivist analysis of two interrelated socioeconomic reforms to actualize spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing. These reforms are, namely, the large-scale public rental housing provision and the equally large-scale conversion of peasant migrants hukous. Expanding on Polanyi's (1957) view of the economy as "instituted" by redistribution, reciprocity and market exchange, the discussion explored how these three modes of integration intersect in Chongqing to produce the "stability" necessary for the national-scale expansion of (capitalistic) industrialization. This intersection in turn underscores the fluid and trans-local nature of the social embeddedness in China: it is constituted by centrally-instituted redistributive policies and inter-regional reciprocity that were set in motion by earlier layers of instituted uneven development (ref. sections 3 and 4).
By extension, it disrupts the prevailing assumption in Polanyi-inspired studies that unproblematically takes the national scale as the primary scale of socioeconomic integration.
That location plays an active role in determining socioeconomic change reinforces and refines the Polanyian conceptualization of the 'double movement'. For Polanyi, the 'double movement' represents an opposition between market mechanisms and the social formations within which these mechanisms are situated (ref. section 2). This 'double movement' is intrinsically a paradox because it is through oppositional forces that a socioeconomic formation evolves in a forward motion. Through generating strong debates and attention nationwide, the socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing brought attention to issues stemming from the CPC's own marketization drive on the back of instituted uneven development. Yet the decision to launch the 'counter movement' in a geographicallytargeted location indicates how the opposition internal to the 'double movement' is placespecific: it simultaneously pushes against and is hemmed in by the broader state spatiality in which it is located. This phenomenon in turn raises a searching question that demands elaborate research on its own: why did the CPC persist with the "dual structure" to the point of having to generate its own (spatial) contradiction? The fact that no operational budget has been drawn up to overcome this Mao-era legacy at the national scale -even after the official acknowledgement of its encumbrance at the 3 rd Plenum of the 18 th Congress in November 2013 -is telling: institutionalized spatial unevenness remains of constitutive value for the regulation of Chinese economy and society (cf. Lim, 2014) . This value arguably generated strong opposition to the quest for spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing. Ironically, however, Granted provincelevel city (zhixiashi) status
Billion (yuan) Year
• First (and at the time of writing, still the only) city in China's interior to be granted this status • Discursively identified as the 'window' to and 'dragon head' of the west • Entrusted by the central government to fulfill '4 big things' (sijiandashi), namely 1) the resettlement of migrants affected by the Three Gorges Dam construction; 2) the reformation of old industrial bases; 3) the 'lifting' of the poor in rural villages; and 4) the protection of the biophysical environment. • Plan devised by Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development; announced in February.
• Only city amongst the five designated cities -Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangzhou -not located along the coast 2010 Liangjiang New Area officially opened for development
• Unveiled on 18 June, the same date when Chongqing became a provincelevel city • An economic development zone spanning 1200km 2 , within which experimental policies are devised and implemented • Positioned as 'one door, two centres and three bases ' (yimenhu, liangzhongxin, sanjidi) , namely 1) the main entry point to western China; 2) both an import-export trading centre and a financial centre in the Yangtze upstream region; and 3) the bases for modern manufacturing, exportprocessing and the commercialization of R&D outcomes ; data compiled and translated by author. * After this standpoint is cross-referred with the published regulations, the relationship between huji conversion and ownership of land use rights remains unclear: the new regulation states plainly rural residents have three years to relinquish their land if they choose to convert huji, which contradicts the discursive statements that huji conversion is not entwined with land rights transfer. The disentanglement of huji conversion with land rights transfers -which precludes the creation of a 'third category' of citizens with urban huji status and rural land use rights -therefore remains a policy 'grey zone'.
